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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADVANCED MANAGEMENT 
CONCEPTS, INC. 
Appellant, 
vs. 
STAFFING AMERICA, INC. 
Appellee. 
Case No:20040524-CA 
MOTION OF APPELLANT TO AMEND BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Pursi ant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Appellant respectfully moves the Court to permit Appellant to withdraw its Fourth 
Argument ent tied "The Trial Court Had No Jurisdictional Authority To Compel A 
Third Party, P.edland Insurance Company To Place Funds In Escrow Pursuant To A 
Garnishment \ction By Staffing" located on pages 33 through 38 of the brief. 
Subsequent to filing its Brief, Appellant concluded that it did not desire to 
pursue the arc uments set forth under the above Fourth Argument and therefore 
respectfully noves this Court to grant leave for Appellant to withdraw its Fourth 
Argument. Appellee has responded to Appellant's Fourth Argument on pages 32 
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through 36 of its brief and while Appellee's argument is well taken, Appellee does not 
request an injunction, stay or other extraordinary proceeding with respect to the money 
presented helc in the Court Ordered escrow. 
Therefore, as there is no damage to either party by the withdrawal of 
kppeWajvV s> F wxrth PtfgvR&xk, A p^^ llasA tespectfuUy requests, tiaaitiha. Oasrt. grasA 
Appellant's Notion to Amend its Brief by Withdrawing the Fourth Argument. 
Y?f Dated thi^y-flay of March, 20Q5 
y ,.., .. ,. / _ 
DONALDJOSEPH P|JRSER ~ 
Attorney for Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion of 
Appellant to Amend Brief of Appellant, via United States Post Office, postage prepaid, 
to: 
Matthew C. Barneck 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
50 South Main 
Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
on the _ i _ day ofjasrfelf,2005. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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Staffing America, a Delaware 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
Advanced Management Concepts, 
Inc., a Nevada corporation; 
Pacific Life & Annuity Company 
(fka PM Group Life Insurance 
Company and/or Pacific Mutual 
Life Insurance Company) a 
California corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
ORDER 
Case No. 20040524-CA 
This matter is before the Court on Appellant's motion, filed 
April 5, 2005, to amend its brief of Appellant. 
Appellant seeks to withdraw its fourth argument entitled 
"The Trial Court had no Jurisdictional Authority to Compel a 
Third Party, Redland Insurance Company to Place Funds in Escrow 
Pursuant to a Garnishment Action by Staff", located on pages 33 
through 3 8 of the brief. 
Now, therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the motion is 
granted. The fourth argument of Appellant's brief is stricken. 
Dated this j L day of April, 2005. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Russell jy. Bench, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on April 12, 2005, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to 
the parties listed below: 
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50 S MAIN #700 
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SALT LAKE CITY UT 84110-2465 
DONALD J PURSER 
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2595 E 3300 S 
3RD FLOOR 
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Dated this April 12, 2005. 
By ><^K/L4.4A^ 
Deputy Clerk 
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Statutes: No statutes are relied upon by Appellant 
Cases: 
American States Ins. Co. v. Walker, 486 P.2d 1042 (1971) 34 
Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. 709 P.2d 330 
(Utah 1985) 13-15,16 
Auerbach v. Key Security Police, 680 P.2d 740 (Utah 1984) 37 
Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985) .31-32 
Bernhard v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 915 P.2d 1285 (Colo 1996) 25-26 
Campbell v. State Farm Insurance, 65 P.3d 1134, 2001 UT 89 22-27, 31 
Canyon Country Store v. Bracey 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989) 16-18 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988) 21 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., v. Banberry Crossing, 
780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989) 30,31 
General Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. 918 P.2d 461 (Utah 1996). 31-32 
Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998) 5 
Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, <|[52, 56 P.3d 524 
(Utah 2002) 21 
ProMaxDev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247 (Utah 1997) 5 
Savage v. Educators Ins. Co. 908 P.2d 862, 866 (Utah 1995) 32 
Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co. 722 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986) 15 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) 5 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998) 5 
Winsness v. M.J. Conoco Distributors, Inc.593 P.2d 1303 (1979)....12, 13,15 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is granted to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 3 and 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES and STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ALLOWED APPELLEE TO 
PRESENT EVIDENCE REGARDING SPECULATIVE FUTURE PROFITS and 
IMPROPERLY GRANTED JUDGMENT FOR SPECULATIVE FUTURE 
PROFITS 
2. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED ATTORNEYS' 
FEES AGAINST APPELLANT WHERE THERE IS NO CONTRACTUAL 
PROVISION OR STATUTE ALLOWING THE GRANTING OF ATTORNEYS' 
FEES. 
3. THE EVIDENCE SHOWS APPELLEE SUFFERED 
SUBSTANTIALLY LESS DAMAGES THAN ALLEGED AND THUS A 
JUDGMENT FOR THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED CANNOT BE 
IMPOSED UPON APPELLANT 
4. TJIE TRIAL COURT HAD NO JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
TO COMPEL A THIRD PARTY, REDLAND INSURANCE CO. TO PLACE 
FUNDS IN ESCROW PURSUANT TO A GARNISHMENT ACTION BY 
STAFFING 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"[W]e review the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness, granting 
[them] no particular deference ...." ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247 
(Utah 1997). 
"On the other hand, we review the trial court's findings of fact for clear error, 
reversing only where the finding is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if 
we otherwise reach a firm conviction that a mistake has been made." ProMax, 943 
P.2d at 255 
For a mixed question of law and fact, which requires a trial court to 
determine "whether a given set of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of 
law," State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), "we [still] review legal questions 
for correctness, [but] we may... grant a trial court discretion in its application of 
the law to a given fact situation." Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998). 
Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound discretion of the trial 
court, and will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse of 
discretion." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988) 
Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question of law, which we review 
for correctness. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Appellant does not rely on any constitutional or statutory provisions for 
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relief from the decision of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter concerns the failure of Appellant to provide continuous 
health insurance coverage to Appellee's employee leasing clients. While it is 
undisputed that Appellant failed to pay for promised insurance coverage, the 
dispute in this matter concerns, inter alia, the actual and speculative damages 
suffered by Appellee and whether Appellee is entitled to an award of attorney fees 
on an hourly basis which is much less than a case taken on a contingency fee. 
The matter was tried to the trial court without a jury over two days. The 
trial court awarded judgment in the amount of $451,844, prejudgment interest of 
$269,016.77, attorneys' fees of $240,286.92 (based upon a one-third contingency 
contract), litigation expenses of $39,161.53 and post judgment interest at the rate 
of 3.28% per annum from the judgment date of 19 May, 2004. 
Appellant Advanced Management Concepts, Inc. timely appealed the 
judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. In 1996, Appellant, Advanced Management Concepts, Inc. (AMC) 
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started its business by providing employee benefits to employee leasing companies 
sometimes known as professional employer organizations (plaintiffs exhibit 3, 
S0000045). 
2. In 1996, AMC and appellee, Staffing America, Inc., (Staffing) 
entered into a business relationship and became co-employers of employees of 
Staffing's clients for purposes of health insurance and workmen's compensation 
coverage (trial record, 551, trial transcript, page 17, lines 18-21). 
3. Under their arrangement, Staffing monthly informed AMC of the 
name of each employee to receive health insurance coverage, (tr, 552). 
4. Staffing passed through to AMC the monthly health insurance 
premiums it received from its clients, Staffing took out its commissions or service 
charges prior to sending the client's money to AMC and AMC then paid the group 
health insurance premiums, (tt, p. 20, In. 5-12) 
5. In November of 1996, the group health insurance coverage obtained 
by AMC with the national health insurer known as Jefferson Pilot was cancelled 
due to the alleged failure by AMC to pay the health insurance premiums. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 12, S0000001). 
6. AMC then "self-insured" the clients' employees until it acquired 
new insurance coverage with PM Group starting in July of 1997. (Findings of 
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Fact, para. 30, 33, tr 555-556). 
7. Staffing paid the monthly health insurance premiums received from 
various clients (less their service fee) to AMC from July of 1997 through February 
of 1998. (Findings of Fact, para 34, tr 556). 
8. AMC paid all health insurance premium payments from July, 1997 
through the middle of November, 1997, albeit the payments were late and were 
accepted by PM Group after strong negotiations by an insurance broker. (Findings 
of Fact, paragraphs 33, 37,42, tr 556, 557, 558 
9. However, the late payment plan was unfulfilled and the insurance 
coverage again was cancelled as of November 30,1997 (Findings of Fact, para 36, 
42, tr 557, 558). 
10. From 10 October, 1997 through 25 January, 1998, AMC did not 
notify Staffing of: 
a. its delinquency in premium payments; 
b. notices of cancellation sent by PM Group; 
c. an IRS levy freezing AMC's bank accounts; 
d. negotiations with PM Group of negotiations to reinstate 
coverage; and 
e. the failure of AMC to make the reinstatement payments 
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timely and in full resulting in the final cancellation of the health insurance policies. 
(Findings of Fact, 44, tr 559) 
11. Subsequently, Staffing obtained its own health insurance coverage 
for its employees effective 1 March, 1998. (Findings of Fact, para 46, tr 559). 
12. Staffing paid out actual costs of $143,233.00 in medical claims 
and other costs which should have been paid by the AMC health insurance benefits 
programs. (Findings of Fact, para. 48, tr 559-560). 
13. Staffing paid $79,612 of its clients' monies in payments to AMC 
for health insurance premiums to employees, however, AMC did not use the 
monies to pay for the health insurance premiums. (Findings of Fact, para 49, tr. 
560) 
14. Staffing claimed it lost "several" clients as a result of the 
cancellation of the health insurance coverage through PM Group and the trial court 
found, with reasonable certainty, that the amount of profit lost by Staffing was 
$228,999. (Findings of Fact, para 50, tr. 560). 
15. In contradiction of evidentiary standards, Dan Roberts, a witness 
for Staffing, testified: 
Well, it was-it was a devastation to the company, because we 
immediately lost our clients and some of the clients were substantial 
for our company. And when they went off our service, but not only 
went off but they tried to take other people with them, so that the word 
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got out rapidly. And so over the next, you know, year, year and a half, 
we tried to reconcile, we tried to find other companies to carry their 
health insurance, we tried to-and we did with a few of them, but many 
of them we lost, probably 20, 30 per cent of our income almost 
immediately. So it was quite devastating. 
But the-not only that, but the effect of future business with 
people I had been working on, or with some of our sales-type people 
that were referring business to us lost credibility. Staffing America 
lost credibility in certain states, and it was difficult to recover. And in 
most instances, we haven't recovered yet. So-but, immediately, we 
saw a tremendous effect on our income, (tt, p. 78,112-19) 
15. The total principal damages claimed as lost by Staffing was 
$451,844 (Findings of Fact, para 52, tr. 560). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Future lost profits were not proved by Staffing as its own exhibits 
testify of increased income in years subsequent to the alleged actions of AMC and 
highly variable costs not consistent with projections of stable income and 
expenses. 
Attorneys' fees are not permitted in this matter as there was never a 
fiduciary relationship established between AMC and Staffing, but rather, Staffing 
was a mere conduit for employee funds which were passed on to AMC for 
payment of health insurance premiums. When AMC failed to timely make certain 
of the payments, AMC paid costs incurred by the employees and thus affirmed the 
fiduciary relationship which it had established with the employees. That same 
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fiduciary relationship never existed between Staffing and AMC and therefore it 
was in error for the trial court to find that Staffing was entitled to over $270,000 of 
attorney fees based upon a breach of a fiduciary relationship between AMC and 
Staffing. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ALLOWED APPELLEE TO 
PRESENT EVIDENCE REGARDING SPECULATIVE FUTURE PROFITS and 
IMPROPERLY GRANTED JUDGMENT FOR SPECULATIVE FUTURE 
PROFITS 
Case law in Utah is clear that lost profits cannot be awarded when such profits 
are speculative and are not soundly based upon evidentiary fact. While Staffing 
testified at trial that it had lost business, its numbers and figures for such lost 
business could not be articulated and were speculative and turbid at best. Staffing 
testified that "several" clients were lost as a result of the failure of health insurance 
by AMC and that "a number" of clients dropped business dealings because of the 
insurance problems. Business dropped off by "20% to 30%" and AMC did not 
acquire new business at the same rate which it had prior to the insurance 
difficulties with AMC. 
While at first blush Staffing seems to present a case for lost profits, a close 
examination of the applicable case law illustrates that Staffing has failed to carry 
the burden of proof to be entitled to receive an award for lost profits. Below, 
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AMC discusses those cases which are pertinent to the question of damages 
awarded for lost profits. 
1. Winsness v. M.J. Conoco Distributors, Inc.593 P.2d 1303 (1979). 
Winsness leased land to Conoco in which Conoco agreed to operate a gas station 
24 hours per day with the lease payment based on a percentage of the gasoline 
sales. Winsness presented proof at trial that the station was not open for 24 hours 
per day and was frequently closed. 
Because the lease payment was a percentage of sales, Conoco argued that it 
was making full lease payments and that there were no grounds to terminate the 
lease. Winsness disagreed, claiming it was suffering substantial damages from the 
failure of Conoco to provide around the clock service at the gas station. The Utah 
Supreme Court ruled 
'The crucial issue as to the first claim for relief is whether Lessor adduced 
evidence from which a jury could have reached a conclusion as to the 
amount of Lessor's money damages based on something more substantial 
than speculation." Id. at 1305. 
"The subject of certainty of proof as to damages has frequently concerned 
this Court and most others. While subscribing to the doctrine that a verdict 
based on "mere speculation" cannot be upheld, we have consistently 
recognized that some degree of uncertainty is inevitable in damage 
determinations of the type involved in this suit. 
"Professor Corbin states the controlling principles which are consistent with 
the Utah cases: 
There is little that can be regarded as "certain, " especially with 
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respect to what would have happened if the march of events had been 
other than it in fact has been. Neither court nor jury is required to 
attain "certainty" in awarding damages; and this is just as true with 
respect to "value" as with respect to "Profits." Therefore, the term 
"speculative and uncertain profits" is not really a classification of 
profits, but is instead a characterization of the evidence that is 
introduced to prove that they would have been made if the defendant 
had not committed a breach of contract. The law requires that this 
evidence shall not be so meager or uncertain as to afford no 
reasonable basis for inference, leaving the damages to be determined 
by sympathy and feelings alone. The amount of evidence required and 
the degree of its strength as a basis of inference varies with 
circumstances. A greater amount and a higher degree are required in 
those cases in which it is usually possible to produce it than in cases 
where it is usually impossible or difficult and the defendant has reason 
to know i t . . . . " Corbin on Contracts, vol. 5, section 1022 (emphasis 
added). Winsness, supra at 1306. 
The principal adduced is that the evidence supporting damages for lost 
profits must be substantial with no reference to feelings of sympathy for the injured 
party. This is good reasoning, and applied to the case at hand, while the third 
party observer would certainly be sympathetic to the plight of Staffing, that same 
third party observer cannot adduce sufficient evidence from any witness produced 
by Staffing, to determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, the amount of 
any damages which had been and which would be suffered by Staffing as a result 
of the negligent actions by AMC. 
2. Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985). 
Mountain Bell listed same telephone number for two St. George law firms. Mt. 
Bell eventually changed the number of one firm and placed an intercept on the 
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number. Atkins sued the telephone company for lost profits and the jury awarded 
damages to Atkins, determining that the telephone number error caused Atkins 
substantial damages. The Supreme Court overruled. 
"To prove damages, the plaintiff must prove two points. First, it must 
prove the fact of damages. The evidence must do more than merely 
give rise to speculation that damages in fact occurred; it must give rise 
to a reasonable probability that the plaintiff suffered damages as a 
result of the breach. Second, the plaintiff must prove the amount of 
damages. The level of persuasiveness required to establish the fact of 
loss is generally higher than that required to establish the amount of a 
loss." Mat336. 
"While the standard for determining the amount of damages is not so 
exacting as the standard for proving the fact of damages, there still 
must be evidence that rises above speculation and provides a 
reasonable, even though not necessarily precise, estimate of 
damages." Id. 
The amount of damages may be based upon approximations, if the 
fact of damages is established, and the approximations are based upon 
reasonable assumptions or projections." Id. 
"In this case, Atkin offered no proof whatsoever of lost net income. 
Proof of loss of gross income only is an insufficient foundation for 
proof of amount of damages." Id. 
While Staffing attempted to introduce evidence, albeit speculative, regarding 
damages for lost income, the question begs: Was it for lost profits or lost income? 
A distinction with a difference which is not answered by Staffing. 
Although determination of damages may be based on approximations, those 
approximations must be based upon reasonable assumptions. In order for an 
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assumption to be reasonable, there must be some foundation laid by the testifying 
witness of the nature and scope of the damages and the calculations used to arrive 
at such damage calculation. 
In the instant case, the foundation laid for determining damages is a mere 
extrapolation based on guesses of how growth would expand Staffing's future 
business. There is no reference to industry norms, to the rate of growth of the 
economy, to the negative influence of competitors driving down profit margins or 
to any other variables necessarily needed to develop a true and accurate projection 
of the growth of Staffing. As already quoted above, 
The amount of damages may be based upon approximations, if 
the fact of damages is established, and the approximations are based 
upon reasonable assumptions or projections." Atkin Wright & Miles v. 
Mountain States Tel 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985) 
3. Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co. 722 R2d 773 (Utah 1986) Sawyers sold 
end-dump coal trailers and had a line of credit from FMA to supply interim 
financing for the trailers. Shortly after starting business, FMA cancelled the line of 
credit causing Sawyers to lose their distributorship. Trial court found that FMA 
wrongfully canceled line of credit but that damages to Sawyers were too 
speculative and the evidence was insufficient to enable the court to determine the 
amount of damages. The only issue on appeal was whether court erred in denying 
15 
damages for loss of future profits. 
"The fact of damages must be proved with reasonable certainty and 
the amount by a reasonable though not necessarily precise estimate, 
citing Atkin" Id at 777. 
"A party is entitled to recover only lost net profits, [emphasis added] 
[cites] Net profits are determined by computing the difference 
between the gross profits and the expenses that would be incurred in 
acquiring such profits, [cite] Therefore, proof of lost gross profits 
does not afford courts a proper basis for a damage award, where there 
is no evidentiary basis on which to calculate net profits with 
reasonable certainty, [cites] Id. 
"Reasonable certainty requires more than a mere estimate of net 
profits. In addition to proof of gross profits, there must generally be 
supporting evidence of overhead expenses or other costs of producing 
income from which a net figure can be derived, [cites] Plaintiff, of 
course, has the burden to produce a sufficient evidentiary basis to 
establish the fact of damages and to permit the trier of fact to 
determine with reasonable certainty the amount of lost net profits, 
[cites]. 
"Plaintiffs here presented evidence on gross profit losses only. Their 
failure to place before the court financial summaries, monthly sales 
volume breakdowns, costs of sales expenses, or any other overhead 
expenses from which the trial court could reasonably have calculated 
plaintiffs lost net profit is fatal to their claim." Id. at 775. 
The testifying expert must calculate not only the lost income, but also the 
expenses which had to be incurred to produce the lost income, including, financial 
summaries, monthly sales volume breakdowns, costs of sales expenses and 
evidence of overhead costs. Without such information, the court cannot 
reasonably determine the amount of profits lost, and the claim should fail to pass 
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evidentiary muster in the court below. 
As applied to the case at bar, Staffing's expert witness, Paul Shields, 
testified that he prepared Exhibit 55 which contains part 4, entitled Comparative 
Income Statements and Calculation of Avoided Costs. While there is no 
testimony elicited from the witness regarding the means and method he used to 
project the sales for future years, there is also no testimony given by him 
explaining the unusual calculations of avoided costs. 
Avoided costs are those overhead costs not incurred when sales are lost. As 
stated by Mr. Shields: 
So while they [Staffing] may have lost, you know, just to throw out a 
number, $1,000 worth of revenue, they don't have to make trips to 
Georgia, their telephone expenses may go down, they may have fewer 
office supplies and other costs because those sales were reduced. (TR, 
pg 313, In 5-9) 
In examining Exhibit 55, part 4, we look at the avoided costs calculated by 
Mr. Shields to determine if such calculations are reasonable. If his calculations of 
avoided costs are reasonable, then his calculations of projected income and profits 
are very likely reasonable. 
Staffing shows income for the years 1997 through 2002 as follows: 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
17 
1,699,011 1,273,384 4,554,627 3,523,622 2,734,494 3,037,008 
As a percentage of the prior year's income, years 1998 through 2002 are: 
.749 3.576 .773 .776 1.110 
The trend in the receipt of income shows not a decline after the allegedly nefarious 
acts of AMC in 1996 and 1997, but an increase! While the difference between the 
1997 and 1998 income declines by 25.1 percent, the increase in the following year 
of 1999 is 357%! And the income for 2000 is still more than double the income 
for 1997, the year after the negligent acts of AMC. This is an amazing increase of 
income for a company allegedly damaged and ruined by the failure of AMC to pay 
health insurance premiums. 
4. Canyon Country Store v. Bracey 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989). The 
plaintiff's truck was in accident and the insurer refused to pay, stating the tires on 
the truck were bad and there was no liability. The jury awarded damages for lost 
profits, which the insurer appealed. Addressing the trial court's determination of 
lost profits, the Utah Supreme Court opined: 
"Finally, the amount awarded for lost profits was speculative. No 
contracts had ever been entered into by Canyon Country, and the only 
evidence of an amount lost was given by Frank Stuart, a financial 
consultant.... No other proof regarding the existence and number of 
these hypothetical customers was offered. And, the amount of lost 
profits was not shown with sufficient certainty to allow recovery." Id. 
at 419. 
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"Although there is not enough evidence in the record to support (lit 
trucking business lost profits award, we affirm the lost profits 
awarded from Canyon Country's grocery business. Evidence, 
although conflicting with that of the insurers, was presented at trial 
sufficient to prove the fact of lost profits, their causation, and the 
amount. Canyon Country's expert witness Stuart testified about a net 
profit forecast based upon voluminous sources, including the store's 
books and records and evidence of actual profits of similar businesses. 
Although Canyon Country never made a profit during its short 
lifespan, the jury apparently believed that, had the insurers paid the 
claim promptly, Canyon Country would have been able to continue 
and conduct business profitably." Id. at 419 
The key to the anal)/ sis is that tl le expert, witness provided evidence of 
actual profits of similar businesses. The Canyon Count -• ; -M v*e 
and trouble to evaluate the actions and activities of similar uubincisis so ih.: ? 
of fact could reasonably determine whether the plaintiff's expert witness was 
creating numbers out of air, (unsupported speculation) or was using projections 
based upon the experience of similar businesses. Because the Canyon Country 
plaintiffs took the time and effort to research and present the activities of similar 
businesses to Ihe com! iitc I Ihih Supiviiu' < "inn I upheld the award of damages. 
Unfortunately for Staffing Amen* .1, then expert did m»i Like tin- tune to 
undertake such an exercise, instead only using numbers, projections and hopelul 
expectations of the management of Staffing. In part 7 of Exhibit 55, Staffing's 
expert witness projects that two accounts which would have been acquired but for 
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the actions of AMC were not acquired in each of the years 1999 through 2002. 
Interestingly, for 1998, the monthly lost profits for the accounts which would have 
been acquired (presumably) are established at an average of $4,920 per account 
while the average of the monthly profits for the existing accounts is $3712. The 
expert does not justify why he pegs awarding twenty-five percent more profits to 
speculative, future and unknown acquired accounts than he does to the existing 
accounts. 
Staffing's expert witness is not basing his projections of profit loss on 
comparative businesses, but on numbers extrapolated from an unknown, and 
therefore, unacceptable source. 
The Utah appellate courts have established a clear standard for proving 
damages for future profits and Staffing has failed to meet that standard. Therefore, 
that portion of the judgment pertaining to future profits should be exorcised and the 
judgment should be reduced accordingly. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED ATTORNEYS' FEES 
AGAINST APPELLANT WHERE THERE IS NO CONTRACTUAL 
PROVISION OR STATUTE GRANTING ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
a. There is no provision for an award of attorney fees. 
It is established law in Utah that "Attorney fees are generally recoverable in 
Utah only when authorized by statute or contract." Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. 
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Co., 2002 UT 68, <|[52, 56 PJd 524 11K J . JU02). .. 
When attorney fees are granted by the court, a very careful analysis ui me 
attorneys'fees is undertaken: 
In exercising its discretion to determine reasonable attorney fees for 
purposes of an attorney fee award, the trial court should find answers to four 
questions: 
1. What legal wmi was »n liKtliy (HiloniiaP 
2. How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to adequately 
prosecute the matter? 
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates customarily charged 
in the locality for similar services? 
4. Are thpre circumstances which require consideration of additional factors, 
including those listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility? Dixie State 
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988) 
By claiming that it is entitled to attorney fees based not on the actual legal 
work undertaker), the fuue it) prosecute the matter, whether the billing rate is 
customary or wheth* ; :3 ^ re are additioi lal factors, bi it i athei c >i 1 1 i coi itii lgei icy basis 
of one-third of the amount collected, Staffing eviscerates the ei itire bod) ' of legal 
analysis carefully crafted by the Utah courts over the years to evaluate and 
carefully weigh a fair and reasonable amount of attorney fees to be awarded to a 
successful litigant entitled to attorney fees. 
b. There is no fiduciary relationship proven and no basis for attorney fees 
for breach of a fiduciary relationship. 
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Staffing argues to the trial court that it does not have to meet the standards 
established by Dixie State, supra and its progeny because it fits under a unique 
category in the field of breach of fiduciary duty. Why a breach of a fiduciary duty 
entitles a successful litigant to receive a blanket one-third of contingency 
collection, without any determination of the hours expended, the hourly rate 
charged or the reasonableness of either is not explored by Staffing, but rather, 
Staffing merely obliquely refers to the right granted to the victim of a bad faith 
insurance defense claim to justify a $240,286.92 award of attorney fees in this 
matter. 
Staffing relies on Campbell v. State Farm Insurance, 65 P.3d 1134, 2001 UT 
89, which finds that State Farm Insurance breached a fiduciary duty to its insured 
when it refused to defend and protect Campbell who was involved in an 
automobile accident. While Campbell certainly is good law for bad faith insurance 
automobile liability cases, the analogy between Campbell and the case at bar takes 
a fair stretch to justify the results obtained. The insured in Campbell had a written, 
paid for and defined contract with State Farm requiring State Farm to defend and 
protect him from the economic effects of an automobile accident. State Farm 
refused to extend such protection, breached its fiduciary duty to Campbell and was 
therefore subject to compensatory damages suffered by Campbell and substantial 
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punitive damages awarded by the j ury. 
The analogy does not carry over to the instant case. First, AMC was not a 
fiduciary for Staffing, but rather, AMC is the fiduciary for each insured. Staffing 
was but a condiiit for the receipt of the monthly insurance payments withheld from 
the insured's periodic paycheck. 
[Testimony by expert witness, Paul Shields] 
Now, the way Staffing America does their business, what they 
do is they receive from their customers or clients the amount of the -
the full amount of the gross payroll. And so that would include, you 
know—well, they receive the full amount of the gross payroll plus a 
commission for providing their service. So that gross amount comes 
to them. And then what happens is they cut a check for the health 
insurance coverage, they cut a check for state and federal 
unemployment insurance and FICA and whatever other deductions, 
you know, come out of the payroll. And so what they are left with, 
then, after they pay all of those expenses is this commission amount. 
Transcript, page 314-315, In 17-25, 1-2. 
Thus Staffing was not deprived of any money or income when they 
forwarded the health insurance payments on to AMC. Staffing received a gross 
amount of income, paid the expenses from that gross amount and then kept the 
balance for their o, >mmi Wu m .iiitl |»t \>l il Nulling was a con "rustor, 
trustee or beneficiary. When Staffing received the i i 101 icy ft oi i i. its client, Staffing 
had a fiduciary duty to properly dispose of and allocate the money as directed. At 
the moment that Staffing sent the money on to AMC, Staffing's interest and duty 
with respect to the disposition of the funds ceased and its fiduciary duties were 
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then fully satisfied. 
At the point when the health insurance premiums paid by the employees 
were received by AMC, Staffing was out of the loop of responsibility and duty, 
and there was a fiduciary duty then established between AMC and the employee. 
AMC had the duty to pay the health insurance premium to protect the client, and 
indeed, a fiduciary relationship was then established between the employee and 
AMC 
When AMC failed to timely make health insurance premium payments and 
employees were monetarily injured by the lack of current health insurance, AMC 
actually reimbursed the employees for their out of pocket costs. AMC did not pay 
Staffing for the medical expenses as it would have if there was a fiduciary 
relationship between AMC and Staffing, but rather, because there was no fiduciary 
relationship with Staffing, AMC directly paid the employees their incurred medical 
expenses. 
In certain cases, AMC did fulfill its fiduciary responsibility to the employees 
by paying the medical expenses of the injured employees. Staffing also 
participated in such payment of monies to the injured employees and therefore, 
exercised one of the indicies indicating a fiduciary relationship between Staffing 
and the injured employee. Staffing did not directly pay AMC the employee's out 
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of pocket expenses anticipating that AMC \ vo\ ild fi ill ill 1:1 ic c h in ned fiduciary 
relationship, but Staffing paid such expenses on its own, without tl ic involvement 
of AMC, thus verifying and sustaining the fiduciary relationship it initially 
established with the employee when it accepted the employee's gross wages. 
c. Indicators of a Fiduciary Relationship: 
The question then arises: what are the indicators of a fiduciary relationship? 
Case law gives us some guidance: 
Attorney fees may be recoverable in an action for breach of fiduciary 
duty as a recognized exception to the American rule. In Heller v. First Nat'l 
Bank, N.A., 657 P.2d 992 (Colo. App. 1982), the court of appeals found 
that, because the standard of conduct required of a trustee is so high, the goal 
in a breach of trust action is to make the injured party whole, and thus the 
court has the discretion to award attorney fees if necessary to meet that goal. 
This court later upheld Heller in Buder v. Sartore, 774 P.2d 1383 (Colo. 
1989). Buder concerned a breach of fiduciary duty action. This court 
reasoned that, as in a breach of trust action, the goal in a breach of fiduciary 
duty action is to make the injured party whole. Hence, the injured party is 
entitled to recover attorney fees if necessary to restore that party to his or her 
pre-injury status. Buder, 774 P.2d at 1391. Bernhard v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 915 P.2d 1285 (Colo. 04/22/1996). 
Bernhard involves an insurance claim, similar to that discussed in Campbell, 
supra, with the Colorado court referrii ig tc tl le ii ISI it ai ice coo lpai ly's i elatioi iship 
with the insured as a "quasi-fiduciary duty." While the Colorado court rejected 
establishing a fiduciary duty by the insurance company with the insured (contrary 
to the outcomein Campbell), the law set forth above does establish a few of the 
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sought after indices to find that a fiduciary duty exists: 
1. standard of conduct of the trustee is high 
2. goal is to make the injured party whole 
With the above indices in mind, we then turn to Campbell to flesh out 
further indicators: 
Under Utah law, plaintiffs may recover attorney fees if they are 
successful in pursing a first-party bad faith suit against their insurer. Billings 
v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah 1996). Such actions fall 
within the rule that the damages available to plaintiffs "include both general 
damages, i.e., those flowing naturally from the breach, and consequential 
damages, i.e., those reasonably within the contemplation of, or reasonably 
foreseeable by, the parties at the time the contract was made." Beck v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985). The rationale behind 
allowing recovery of both general and consequential damages in first-party, 
bad faith actions is "to remove any incentive for insurers to breach the duty 
of good faith by expanding their exposure to damages caused by such a 
breach beyond the predictable fixed dollar amount of coverage provided by 
the policy." Billings, 918 P.2d at 466. Consequential damages in first-party 
bad faith actions can be awarded for such things as attorney fees, loss of a 
home or business, damages flowing from bankruptcy, and mental anguish, 
provided such damages are foreseeable. Id. at 468; Beck, 701 P.2d at 802. 
Campbell supra at 1145 
Additional indices are thus identified: 
3. First party bad faith suit 
4. Damages flow naturally from breach 
5. Damages forseeable and within the contemplation of the 
parties at the time of the contract 
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Campbell explains its grant of attorney fees as a resi lit of a well recognized 
exception to a rale against awarding attorney fees in tort cases: 
We do, however, accept its assertion that breach of a fiduciary 
obligation is a well-established exception to the American rule precluding 
attorney fees in tort cases generally. We thus conclude that the trial court 
correctly held attorney fees to be a proper element of damages in this case. 
Id 
The case at bar is not characterized as a tort action by either party; the 
instant case does not involve insurers; and, by the delineation of the five factors for 
the establishment of a fiduciary duty set forth above, this case does not involve the 
breach of a fiduciary duty by AMC towards Staffing. With respect to the simple 
payment of I; ^ i insurance premiums as the duty existed between Staffing and 
AMC, the sti!!:<i ^ *ven if we del; i nine 
that the standard of co t ; j 
does not exist in the Staffing/AMC relationship because Staffing w:is ilot directly 
injured by AMC's failure to make the health insurance premium payment. 
Staffing may have been ultimately injured by AMC's actions, but the injury 
is indirect, not easily quantifiable, uncertain of its parameters, extent and 
dimensions. The persons actually injured, that is, the employees, were not parties 
to the •? Hr interests were not represented at the trial and there was 
no assignmei it b> si icl :i pei sen is to tl ie plaii itil f regai din ig tl leii separate and distinct 
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interests. 
The above analysis also eliminates any claim which Staffing may have under 
the last three prongs of the fiduciary relationship analysis: 1. AMC was not a first 
party insurer; 2. No damages flowed naturally to Staffing from AMC's failure to 
make payments, rather, the damages resulted in an alleged loss of confidence by 
Staffing's clients in Staffing's ability to keep health insurance premiums current; 
and 3. The damages were not clearly forseeable and were not contemplated by the 
parties at the time of the formation of the contract. Staffing knew about the break 
in periodic health insurance premium payments for nearly twelve months and if it 
could have foreseen an alleged loss of income (a loss of income not illustrated by 
Staffings' Exhibit 55 but alleged nevertheless) it would have immediately acted by 
not forwarding withheld health insurance premiums on to AMC and would have 
immediately stopped all payments to AMC and made such payments directly and 
immediately to the health insurance providers on behalf of the potentially injured 
employees. 
So either the ultimate damages resulting from AMC's failure to make the 
periodic health insurance payments were not forseeable, or Staffing itself was 
simply negligent in continuing to send payments to AMC. We presume that 
Staffing was net negligent, not wanting to unnecessarily impugn the integrity and 
28 
good judgment of Staffing, therefore, we must conclude that the damages were not 
foreseeable. 
Under none of the above criteria is a fiduciary duty established between 
AMC and Staffing. The fiduciary relationship which did exist existed directly 
between AMC and the employees without any intervening participation or 
involvement by Staffing. As soon as Staffing received the health insurance 
withholdings from the employees. > ;^\M ( * H : * -
e m p l o y e e b \ M - . J : . ••..•' ; • *• .*• -^  - ? ?. -i • 
insurance prei nium. I he fiduciary duty then transferred from employee and 
Staffing to the employee and AMC, with AMC then bearing a duty of payment for 
the benefit of the employee. At no point in the transaction does a fiduciary duty 
arise between AMC and Staffing, for Staffing was but a conduit, receiving no 
direct benefit from AMC's payment of the health insurance premiums and not 
receiving any direct damage from the failure of AMC to fulfill its duty to v.« 
employee. 
rims, \\'i In no fiducia> • -ty established, cai ried o\ it or broken between 
AMC and Staffing, there can be no award for attorney fees arising from a breach of 
a fiduciary responsibility and the award of attorney fees should be stricken. 
d. There could exist no fiduciary duty under the circumstances of this case: 
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In the case of First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., v. Banberry Crossing, 780 
P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989), the Supreme Court stated that in the case of assessing a 
Trustee's duty:* 
"a trust itself creates a duty between the Trustee and a beneficiary. But the 
Trustee's duty to the beneficiary does not imply that the Trustee may ignore 
the trustor's rights and interest." Id. at 1256. 
The Court went on to explain that in certain circumstances, "it is possible that the 
Trustee is bound by a fiduciary duty to act in the interest of the trustor." Id. Said 
circumstances are as follows: 
1. where a trustor reposes its trust or confidence in the Trustee and 
relies on the Trustee's guidance; 
2. where the Trustee could exercise extraordinary influence over the 
trustor; and 
3. where the Trustee stands at a dominant position to the Trustor. 
In the instant case, AMC was simply acting as a facilitator for that which 
could have been done by Staffing America directly. And, in the instant case, no 
fiduciary relationship existed. This is simply a breach of contract case. 
e. There is no precedent for awarding attorney fees in the instant case: 
While Staffing relies on Campbell, supra, to justify its position, it is critical 
to note why insurance companies in third-party situations owe such a duty. The 
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cases cited by Staffing in it trial briefs all concern third party claims brought under 
limited circumstances. 
In Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985) the 
Supreme Court noted that a fiduciary relationship exists between insurers and the 
insured in a third-party situation because the insured controls the disposition of 
claims against its insured who relinquishes any right to negotiate on his own 
trust ai id reliance placed in the iosi n ei b> 1:1 le ii isiii ed The insured is wholly 
dependent upon the insurers to see that, in dealing with claims by third parties, the 
insured's best interests are protected. Id. at 799. 
Again, as noted above, this was a contractual relationship or as Staffing's 
counsel chose to portend, a negligent handling of procuring health insurance. 
Whether attorney fees should be awarded in a particular case is a question of 
law reviewed for correctness. Under Utah law, a party may recover attorney fees if 
they are successful ii i pi u suit ig a f ii st part) ' bad fait! i si ill: agaii ist tl leii insurer. See, 
General Billings v. Union Bankers Insurance Company, 918 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah 
1996). The rationale allowing recovery of both general and consequential damages 
in first-party, bad faith cases is 
to remove any incentive for insurers to breach the duty of good faith 
by expanding their exposure to damages caused by such a breach 
beyond the predictable fixed dollar amount of coverage provided by 
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the policy. Id. at 466. 
The Utah Supreme Court has countanenced the award of attorney fees and 
litigation costs in limited cases. As Staffing's attorney argued below, "the 
Campbell court also held that '[although the foreseeability of damages test is 
generally limited to the contractual realm, we note that it is used to determine 
damages in the context of tortious, third-party bad faith claims justificed since 
such claims 'arise only because of the contractual relationship of the parties.'" 
(emphasis added)(quoting Savage v. Educators Insurance Company, 908 P.2d 862, 
866 (Utah 1995). It is important to note that the above quotation refers to actions in 
tort and a third party claim, whereas, the instant matter is not a bad faith third party 
claim. 
To permit an order of costs and fees in this case would give rise to a new 
right for a successful plaintiff in a case not otherwise provided for by Utah case 
law or statute. Furthermore, it is somewhat ironic, while testimony was given that 
fees and litigation expenses would have been reasonably foreseeable to AMC, 
unlike Campbell, there is no evidentiary showing that a small California based 
business would anticipate that a contingency fee contract would be used or for 
what amount it would be in Utah. 
4. THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO JURISDICTIONAL 
AUTHORITY TO COMPEL A THIRD PARTY, REDLAND INSURANCE 
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COMPANY TO PLACE FUNDS IN ESCROW PURSUANT T() A 
GARNISHMENT ACTION BY STAFFING 
Prior to the trial in this case, AMC's insurer, Redlands Insurance Company, 
which had previously issued a commercial insurance policy to AMC, filed a 
declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the District of 
Utah, case no. 2-04 - .
 ;, h contends that AMC is not entitled to insurance 
coverage mulei ll i , x v . Such case is currently pending in 
federal court. 
Subsequent to the entry of the amended judgment (28 May, 2004) and 
AMC's filing of its notice of appeal on June 18, 2004, Staffing filed a Writ of 
Garnishment on Redlands Insurance Company in an attempt to seize the full limits 
of a commercial insurance policy issued by Redlands to AMC in spite of the 
existence of the declaratory judgment action seeking to determine whether AMC 
was entitled to insurance coverage. 
Answers to Garnishee Interrogatories were filed In Redlands mi lulv l«). 
2004, subsequent to AMC's docketing statement liliiii; Redlands also filed ,i 
Motion to Quash or Stay the Writ of Garnishment on July 22, 2004. 
A hearing on all the issues was held on October 25, 2004 at which time the 
trial court completely discounted any effect of the pending federal case and 
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determined that "the Writ of Garnishment is a proper vehicle to levy upon the 
Redland Policy as an asset of the Judgment debtor" (Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Order RE Writ of Garnishment to Redland Insurance Company, page 
4, paragraph 1) and that the proceeds of the Redland Policy are not exempt (Id. at 
page 5, paragraph 4). The trial court then ordered that the Redland policy limits of 
$1,000,000 be placed into an escrow account which shall be released to Staffing: 
If the Federal Court rules in favor of SAI, the balance of the account 
including any interest shall be paid over to SAI or its attorneys as it 
may designate. Id. at page 6, paragraph 4. 
In explaining its decision to seize the insurance proceeds, the trial court 
justifies its position by mention of the "authorities referenced by S AI including 
American States Insurance Co. v. Walker, 26 Utah 2d 161, 486 P.2d 1042 (1971). 
The only language in American States which is possibly pertinent to this matter is: 
Dixie Ann Walker was involved in an automobile-motorcycle 
collision, and was sued by Robert W. Clubb, the rider of the motorcycle. She 
claims to be covered by a policy of insurance written by American States 
Insurance Company wherein her father, Marvin J. Walker, is the named 
insured 
The insurance company denied coverage to Dixie Ann on the ground 
that she was not an insured under her father's policy. She retained her own 
attorney and settled the case on a stipulated judgment in favor of Mr. Clubb. 
A garnishment was issued by Clubb, who traversed the answer of the 
insurance company. Upon trial thereof, the lower court held the insurance 
company to be indebted to Dixie Ann Walker and gave judgment against it 
for the use and benefit of Mr. Clubb. 
Subsequent to the service of the writ of garnishment, the insurance 
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company filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to have a determination 
of whether it is liable to Dixie Ann and Clubb under the policy. The trial 
court held that Dixie Ann was an insured under the policy and awarded her 
an attorney's fee for defending the declaratory judgment action. 
The two cases were consolidated on this appeal. 
There are two i i lattei s foi 01 11 detei 1 i linatioi 1: 
1. Was Dixie Ann Walker a resident of her father's household at the time of 
the collision? and 
2. Is she entitled to an attorney's fee for defending the declaratory judgi : 
action? 
486 P.2d 1042, 26 Utah 2d 161 (1971) 
AMC is unclear on how the above case applies in any respect to the instant 
case. In American, supra, there was a dispute regarding insurance coverage, a 
stipulated judgment was rendered between 1 • tcl the si lccessfi il Hi 
garnished the insurance c< •• ' T..-!- : . -id received a trial on the 
issues. The issues did not concern the right of the successful litigant to garnish a 
third party insurance company, but whether the insured lived in Utah and whether 
she was entitled to attorney fees. There is no guidance whatsoever from the 
American court to the instant trial court to guide the trial court's decision of 
whether the third party garnishment is proper, considering the readily apparent fact 
that there is a pending federal court declaratory judgment action, the outcome of 
which will clearly affect the disposition ol \hv funds, regardless of (lie timing 
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between the outcome of the federal court case (and any attendant appeals) and the 
instant case. 
In the event that in the federal case a motion for summary judgment is filed 
by Staffing and granted in favor of Staffing, Staffing will then have the unfettered 
right to seize all $1,000,000 of the funds. But in the very likely event that 
Staffing's award in the instant case is reduced by $500,000 (the approximate sum 
of the attorney fees and lost profits), then, because Staffing could have seized the 
entire $1,000,000, AMC, or Redlands, will be forced to garnish and seize assets of 
Staffing to receive back the money which the trial court now holds out for the party 
with the quickest fruit picking arm. Furthermore, during the pendency of the 
appeal, the instant case and the federal court action, such a ruling eliminates any 
further liability coverage for any other claims or occurrences filed hereafter. 
The findings of fact further state that case law cited Redland does not 
preclude the isi uance of the Writ of Garnishment (Findings, page 4, para. 2) by 
stating that Auerbach Co. v. Key Security Police, Inc, et. al. 680 P.2d 740 (Utah 
1984) has materially different facts. AMC begs to differ. Key Security Police 
transported the nightly deposits of Auerbachs (a Salt Lake City department store) 
to the bank for deposit. The Key police were robbed one night and Auerbach sued 
Key for the money. Key was defunct, but did have an insurance policy which 
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Auerbach then issued a writ of garnishment against the insurer. Such facts are on 
point with the instant case, but even more telling is the result: 
Auerbach mistakenly relies on its judgment against Key Security as a 
liquidated claim instead of on the claim between Key Security and 
Guaranty National. It is undisputed that no proof of loss was ever 
submitted, nor was any investigation or claim adjustment made to 
Guaranty National with respect to the robbery. Auerbach attempts to 
avoid the characterization of its claim against Guaranty National as 
either tort or contract. As a garnishor, Auerbach may act only within 
the framework of Key Security's cause of action; its rights if any, 
against Guaranty National are derivative in nature. Auerbach may not 
pursue Key Security's claim of wrongful denial of coverage through a 
garnishment action, and we hold that Guaranty National's liability, if 
any, is not subject to garnishment. Id. at 742 
The above fact situation and the above ruling by the Utah Supreme court is 
on point in the nstant case. AMC never made a claim against its insurer, 
Redlands. No proof of loss was submitted. The rights of Staffing, if any, are 
derivative in nature as the claims pertain to AMC's actions. However, those rights 
of AMC are in question as evident by the declaratory judgment action in the 
federal court. As Auerbach could not pursue Key Security's claim of wrongful 
denial of coverage through a garnishment action, neither can Staffing pursue its 
claim of coverage through a garnishment on the Redlands issued insurance policy, 
the coverage of which is in serious and substantial dispute. 
To give Staffing the right to seize disputed assets of AMC and Redlands 
37 
without a trial and without following the established case law as set forth in 
Auerbach is patent error by the trial court. AMC prays that this Court rescind the 
October 28, 2004 order of the trial court placing the $1,000,000 in escrow and 
order the imme iiate refund of such funds to Redlands. 
CONCLUSION 
The award for lost profits is speculative and without a solid evidentiary 
basis in the law or in the facts. Staffing fails to carry its burden of proof for such 
alleged lost profits and there is no degree or amount of certainty in the 
establishment cf such lost profits. Thus, the award for lost profits should be 
stricken. 
Similarly, the award for attorney fees should be stricken from the 
judgment. A substantial body of case law has been developed in Utah concerning 
the standards o'~ proof which must be presented to the court regarding the 
reasonableness of an attorney fee award. Staffing's claim that it is entitled to an 
attorney fee is based upon bad faith insurance defense cases. There is no showing 
of bad faith in this case nor is there established a fiduciary duty between the 
litigants. A fiduciary duty was established between Staffing and the employees 
and then between AMC and the employees, but never was a fiduciary duty 
established between Staffing and AMC. Staffing was a mere conduit for the 
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transfer of funds as was AMC. When AMC did not make certain insurance 
payments, there; was no direct injury to Staffing, but rather the injuries were 
suffered by the employees who did not have health insurance coverage when 
needed. 
Because there was no fiduciary relationship established between AMC and 
Staffing, there can be no breach of a fiduciary responsibility. As there was no 
breach of a fidi ciary responsibility with Staffing, attorney fees of over $270,000 
cannot be imposed upon AMC. Thus, the award for attorneys' fees should be 
deleted from the judgment along with the speculative claims for loss profits. 
Finally, ,he trial court's order seizing the full amount of the $1,000,000 
insurance policy issued by Redlands to AMC, which policy is the subject of a 
declaratory jud *ment action in federal court, should be set aside on the grounds 
that there is rig it or precedent for the seizure of the assets and the placement of 
such assets in an escrow account subject only to the outcome of the federal case. 
In the likely event that the instant court substantially reduces the amount of the 
award granteu to Staffing, and in the possible event that the federal court 
declaratory judgment action is unsuccessful by Redlands, AMC and Redlands will 
be forced to pursue Staffing for reimbursement of the amount of the award reduced 
below $1,000,(00. Fairness and equity demand that the sums ordered into escrow 
39 
be released to Redlands pending the final resolution of both the federal court 
declaratory judgment action and the instant appeal. 
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